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Justice Department Inspector General’s Report Raises Troubling Questions About
FBI’s Role in FISA Cases
By Peter Margulies  Thursday, December 12, 2019, 3:04 PM
Despite the conclusion of Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz that the FBI’s initiation of the Russia probe met legal
standards, the report issued Monday by the Of ce of the Inspector General (OIG) strongly criticized the FBI’s handling of one aspect of the probe:
the request for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap of ex-Trump campaign foreign policy adviser Carter Page and subsequent
renewals of the FISA. The OIG report concludes that FBI agents who provided information to senior FBI and Justice Department of cials in
support of the FISA request misled their superiors on three key issues: Page’s prior work with another (unnamed) U.S. government intelligence
agency (apparently the Central Intelligence Agency); his denials of involvement with speci c Russian intelligence operatives; and the reliability of
ex-British spy Christopher Steele, of “Steele dossier” fame, a key source for the FISA request. Indeed, according to the OIG report, the serious
nature of these errors and FBI senior of cials’ failure to detect and remedy them over time raised “signi cant questions” about the effectiveness of
the FBI “chain of command’s management and supervision of the FISA process” (p. 378).
By way of background, here is a brief overview of the FISA process. FISA’s procedural framework requires that Justice Department lawyers applying
for FISA warrants make ex parte (i.e., without notice to the proposed target of the request) submissions to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (the FISC), a tribunal composed of a rotating group of life-tenured federal district judges chosen by the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court. The FISC then decides whether the submission merits granting of approval for the surveillance. To obtain an order from the FISC
authorizing surveillance, the government needs to show probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power, which could include a state
such as Russia or a nonstate actor such as ISIS or al-Qaeda.
As former senior Justice Department lawyer David Kris has explained, the FISC is not a rubber-stamp for government surveillance requests. In
approximately 20 percent of cases, the court seeks additional information from the government prior to approving a request. Yet, the FISC is not
the only barrier to FISA approval. Before FISA requests make it to the court, the FBI sends them to Justice Department lawyers for review and
these lawyers ultimately submit requests to the FISC. As the OIG report notes, to do its job, the FISC requires that these lawyers ful ll a
“gatekeeper” function, ensuring that only requests that are reasonably close to the legal standard get to the court. Because of the sheer volume of
FISA requests, department lawyers cannot adequately compile and verify the factual predicate for each request. FBI agents  ll that gap. Under FBI
guidelines, agents must ensure that information in FISA requests is complete and “scrupulously accurate.” The FISC hears only from the
government, never from a proposed search’s target, so this gatekeeping function is particularly important in ensuring rigor in the process.
To perform that gatekeeper role, Justice Department lawyers depend on line-level FBI agents, who must provide the lawyers with two vital kinds of
data: (a) information supporting the proposed surveillance request and (b) reasonably available information that the proposed request is either
unfounded or unnecessary to obtain information that Congress designed the FISA process to obtain. If a request is based on unreliable sources or
the government has other less intrusive means to obtain the information sought, surveillance triggered by the request would be an inappropriate
and perhaps even illegal impingement on individual privacy. That second privacy-protective bucket of information thus guards against excessive
government surveillance and the targeting of innocent U.S. persons by hostile or heedless public of cials. The OIG report concluded that the
gatekeeping function failed in the Carter Page FISA request, which the FISC granted in 2016 and then renewed several times through much of
2017.
Before going further, it’s important to disaggregate the government’s handling of one investigative tool in the Russia probe from the propriety of
the probe itself. The OIG report, as Benjamin Wittes has observed, concluded that the probe itself was justi ably predicated on clear evidence
provided by a “friendly foreign government” (apparently Australia) of Russian meddling in the 2016 election, based on comments made to an
of cial from that government by another ex-Trump aide, George Papadopoulos, who mentioned that the Russians were inviting Trump campaign
assistance. The Mueller report documents the vast scale of Russian interference, highlighting that the counterintelligence concerns that prompted
the probe were well-founded. The legal threshold for initiating a probe is low; and according to the OIG report, the “predication” (i.e., support) for
the probe easily met this relatively undemanding standard. In this sense, the OIG report does not jibe with the longtime claims of President
Trump and his supporters that political concerns motivated the opening of the investigation. (For a contrary view, see the Dec. 9 statements by
Attorney General William Barr and U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut John Durham, Barr’s choice for a separate Justice Department
investigation into the Russia probe.)
However, the OIG report features detailed discussion of omissions and mischaracterizations in the original Carter Page FISA request and
subsequent requests to renew that surveillance authority.
Privacy Paradox: Rethinking Solitude
Bear in mind that Page himself, an energy consultant with wide experience in Russia who graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and
subsequently earned two master’s degrees and a doctorate, has never been indicted, let alone convicted. One justi cation for the FISA request was
Page’s contact with Russian intelligence of cials. However, merely meeting with another country’s intelligence of cials is not against the law.
Indeed, as Inspector General Horowitz con rmed at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Dec. 11, the FBI now understands that Page was
not an agent of a foreign power during the period covered by the requests.
The OIG report also explained that FBI agents compiling data for the Carter Page FISA request knew that Page had been a source for another U.S.
intelligence agency (identi ed by the New York Times on Tuesday as the CIA) during the relevant time period. Stuart Evans, a senior Justice
Department lawyer involved in the Russia probe, told the OIG that this information would surely have been relevant to the Page FISA application.
Nevertheless, FBI agents did not include it in the initial FISA request and only later checked with Page’s CIA handler, who informed them that
Page had been candid in describing his interactions with Russian intelligence of cials, including one interaction that overlapped with the subject
of the FISA request.
Evans’s caution was prudent: As the OIG report observed, a proposed target’s work on behalf of another U.S. agency supplies an alternative
explanation for a person’s foreign contacts that might otherwise raise suspicion. In fact, work for another U.S. agency raises questions about the
very core of the surveillance request; rather than being an agent of a foreign power, as a surveillance target must be under FISA, the putative
target might actually be a U.S. agent. Justice Department lawyers needed that information to adequately perform their vital gatekeeping role. The
OIG found, however, that FBI agents had misled department lawyers about Page’s role, erroneously claiming that Page had been a U.S. source
much earlier and on matters unrelated to the Russia probe. According to the OIG, FBI agents in fact knew that Page’s time as a U.S. source had
overlapped with the time covered by the Russia probe and concerned matters linked to the Russia investigation. Indeed, the OIG report asserts
that one mid-level FBI lawyer altered a document (a possible felony now under investigation) to conceal information from other government
of cials about Page’s other work (pp. 254-255).
FBI agents had also failed to tell Justice Department lawyers that, in interviews with the bureau, Page had denied reports that he had met with
certain Russian intelligence of cials. This denial might not have dissuaded lawyers from seeking a FISA order or—had lawyers included Page’s
denial in their court papers—might not have impelled the FISC to deny the surveillance request. But Page’s denial would have been evidence
relevant to the Justice Department’s deliberations about the request’s framing. As the OIG report indicated, under government guidelines FBI
agents should have given Justice Department lawyers all the information needed for the department to weigh whether to make a FISA request.
Instead, the OIG report concluded, FBI agents “improperly substituted their own judgments” for the assessment that the FISC expects from the
department (p. 377).
The OIG also criticized FBI agents’ initial failure to fully disclose material information regarding Christopher Steele, a key source for the Page FISA
request. Until late in the preparation of the initial FISA request in October 2016, the FBI did not disclose that Steele had been paid by candidate
Trump’s political opponents to conduct opposition research. That disclosure resulted from repeated questions by Evans. (I discussed the initial
FISA request’s handling of Steele’s links to Trump’s opponents here, although my earlier work did not have the bene t of the OIG’s assessment.)
At Evans’s insistence, the Page FISA request included this evidence of Steele’s potential bias.
However, an in ated claim about Steele’s work nonetheless found its way into the FISA request. Based on material given to the Justice Department
from FBI agents, the request wrongly asserted that information from Steele had been corroborated and used in other “criminal proceedings.” The
OIG noted that FBI agents had found corroboration for only some of Steele’s claims—and some of this corroborating evidence was ultimately
found to be from sources prone to embellishment—and that none had been used in legal proceedings such as trials, judicial motions or the like.
FBI agents sending data to Justice Department lawyers apparently assumed that the government had previously used Steele’s information in
proceedings but had failed to check. Justice Department lawyers and more senior FBI of cials, who depend on FBI line agents as the FISC depends
on Justice Department lawyers, did not independently con rm these claims. That omission, like the other errors discussed in the OIG report, may
not have violated the Constitution or any surveillance statute—the OIG report does not address constitutional or statutory questions directly.
However, as Charlie Savage explained and Inspector General Horowitz’s Dec. 11 testimony con rmed, the OIG report is clear that the omissions
and misrepresentations by FBI agents working on the requests clashed with the procedural safeguards that both the FISC and the Justice
Department have established to curb excessive surveillance. Particularly given the ex parte nature of FISA requests, those safeguards serve to
ensure compliance with the statute and with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
The OIG report does not opine on the materiality of the FBI agents’ omissions and misrepresentations. Would the Justice Department or the FISC
have reached a different result if FBI agents had (a) included material they omitted on Page’s work as a U.S. government source and denials of
meetings with certain Russian of cials and (b) avoided in ating the value of Steele’s previous revelations? The OIG is silent on these questions.
Given the urgency of the Russia investigation and the other evidence of Russia’s efforts, the department might still have requested a FISA warrant,
which FISC may well have approved. However, that is not a foregone conclusion.
As the OIG report noted, the intrusive nature of a FISA warrant should spur questions about the underlying necessity for the intrusion. Recall that
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his concurrence in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, noted that in considering a government request to detain a material witness,
the government should consider whether the subject of the request was “willing to testify if asked” (p. 745). The analogy between forced witness
detention and FISA surveillance is far from perfect, but Kennedy’s logic highlights the importance of pursuing voluntary cooperation before taking
more intrusive investigative steps. In Page’s history as a U.S. government source and in his media appearances since the FISA request became
public knowledge, Page has been talkative to a fault. Particularly since Page had already demonstrated a willingness to work as a U.S. government
source, a Justice Department lawyer might have recommended that agents ask again for Page’s cooperation before seeking a FISA warrant. A FISC
judge might have had a similar reaction before approving a government surveillance request that fully disclosed Page’s past cooperation. Perhaps
the FISC would have sought additional information about Page’s past work with the CIA. The OIG believed that FBI agents staf ng the
investigation should have provided Justice Department lawyers with information about Page’s past work, to equip the lawyers with the
information needed to properly assess whether a FISA request was necessary. That view seems consistent with sound practice.
For the OIG, the repeated failures of FBI line agents staf ng the preparation of the Page FISA request ultimately raised “signi cant questions”
about the FBI’s entire chain of command. Isolated failures can be written off as the by-products of bad apples. But repeated failures, including
those in the renewed FISA requests submitted to and granted by the FISC, cannot be dismissed so readily. The FBI is a hierarchical organization.
Most agents do excellent work in trying circumstances. Despite that record, the OIG report noted that persistent failures may point to leadership
problems and structural  aws. These de cits do not re ect the overt political bias or the elaborate “deep state” conspiracy that President Trump
and his allies  ag as driving forces in the Russia probe. The OIG report found no evidence to support these claims. Nevertheless, the institutional
issues that the OIG report found are worthy of substantial concern.
FBI Director Christopher Wray has taken the OIG’s critique to heart. In an appendix to the OIG report and a letter released on Dec. 9, Wray
acknowledged the OIG’s recommendation that the FBI stress the need for agents to provide senior FBI of cials with all information relevant to
FISA requests. To that end, Wray has ordered more comprehensive use of checklists and other simple but effective devices that will highlight all
evidence, not just evidence favoring a FISA request but also information tending to show that a FISA request is unnecessary. As the OIG suggested,
both kinds of information are essential if the FISA process is to function as Congress intended.
While the FBI director’s response apparently did not go far enough for President Trump, who had hoped for a broader condemnation of the entire
Russia probe, Wray wisely tailored his comments and remedies to address the  aws that the OIG report identi ed. In addition to the measures
outlined above, Wray agreed with the OIG’s recommendation to require senior Justice Department of cials’ approval in order to open
investigations that could implicate First Amendment interests, such as probes of national political campaigns. Though Wray did not mention this
particular reform, Congress may also wish to consider wider authorization for appointment of amici curiae or special public advocates in FISA
cases to provide a perspective distinct from the government’s stance, as in legislation proposed by Sen. Richard Blumenthal. The FISC has already
used amici to assist the court in addressing novel issues. Along with the record of Russian election interference compiled in the Russia probe, such
institutional reforms will be a valuable legacy of the investigation.
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